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 The number of noncitizens arriving at the border has skyrocketed as socioeconomic conditions in South and 
Central America–like the Haitian political crisis, and violence in the Northern triangle–have added to this wave of 
people arriving at the U.S. border.[1] The rate of detention during encounters at the southwestern U.S. border has 
increased by more than five times between July 2020 and July 2021.[2] Between Biden’s inauguration day on 
January 21, 2021 and October 1, 2021, the number of noncitizens detained by ICE or CPB has increased 56% from 
around 14,000 to over 22,000.[3]
 This increase in detention is at odds with the Biden Administration’s stated goal of reducing the average 
detained population capacity by 1,500 beds to 30,000, with a parallel budget reduction of $78 million.[4]  The 
majority of these 30,000 beds–about 92%–will be funded by discretionary distributions totaling $1.44 billion 
when using ICE’s estimated cost of $52,000 per year per bed.[5] The remaining 8% will be funded by mandatory 
fees totaling $124.8 million in FY 2022.[6] Through these “mandatory fees” ICE funds its own systems of 
detention. Normally this could be cured by reducing the number of people in detention and reducing the number 
of fees paid in turn. But there is a loophole. Even if the agency successfully eschews detention for nonimmigrants 
in removal proceedings, ICE can take money from those on bond. This is done through the Breached Bond 
Detention Fund.[7] Given that non-detention alternatives are a priority for the Biden administration,[8] this 
channel is primed to funnel more money into ICE’s coffers in the coming years. Let’s look at this loophole and 
understand how it fits into the noncitizen removal process.
 When an ICE officer commences removal proceedings against a noncitizen, arguing for their deportation, she 
may set a bond of at least $1,500.[9] This permits a noncitizen’s release in exchange for posting collateral, which, 
in the overwhelming majority of cases, takes the form of a cash bond.[10] However, more than half (59%) of the 
433,162 immigration bonds set between the years 2001 and 2021 were over $5,000, with a quarter (25%) set at 
amounts over $10,000.[11] As of 2018, over $1.5 billion of noncitizens’ money in total was held as collateral for 
immigration bonds,[12] and ICE can divert that money to fund its operations with a breach determination. 
 Currently the Breached Bond Detention Fund provides ICE resources to the tune of $55 million a year.[13] 
The agency’s 2014 Bond Management Handbook acknowledges that the money forfeited to these accounts 
directly pays for detention bed space.[14] In the first ten months of Fiscal Year 2018, ICE collected $39.4 million 
from an average 656 breaches per month, averaging about $6,000 per breach.[15] This is concerning when we 
consider the ease with which ICE can determine a bond was breached.
 Federal Regulations instruct that an immigration bond is breached when there has been a “substantial 
violation of the bonds terms.” For I-352 bonds, a single failure to show up to a court date is sufficient to find a 
“substantial violation of the bond’s terms,” because delivery is the bond’s primary condition.[16] A court’s review 
of ICE’s breach determination is also limited to determinations that were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”[17] This gives “great deference to the interpretation given to 
an administrative regulation by the officers or agency charged with its administration.” [18] 
 Perhaps this deferential approach explains why, in a year where there were roughly 7,872 bond breach 
determinations,[19] only 70 appeals were adjudicated on the merits by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) 
related to immigration bonds (I-352).[20] Fifty-five of these claims were dismissed.[21] With such bleak odds of 
success, many may find that a breach determination is not worth appealing. These circumstances are magnified by 
the $640 charge to file an appeal,[22] the general lack of legal representation in immigration court,[23] and a 
noncitizens’ reluctance to draw the increased attention of the legal system.[24] These headwinds stack the deck in 
favor of ICE which has a large amount of power to make and uphold breach determinations, and in turn divert 
millions of dollars to fund its operations. If alternatives to detention programs increase in adoption and the 
practice of issuing immigration bonds grows, the amount of money ICE is poised to gain could also increase. 
Further, if ICE finds itself low on funding, it may decide to use this lever to keep its operations afloat. We must 
stay aware of these outcomes. We do not want to perpetuate a system of detention and should investigate ICE’s 
funding more completely. There are more questions to answer about the connection between ICE bond breaches 
and funding its internal operations. The better we understand these, the better we can reform the broken system 
we find ourselves in.
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